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Single Idea 19147

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth ]

Full Idea

The key role of Convention-T in determining that truth, as characterised by the theory, has the same extension as the intuitive concept of truth makes it seem that it is truth rather than reference that is the basic primitive.

Clarification

Convention-T: "p" is true iff p

Gist of Idea

Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language

Source

Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.35

A Reaction

The key strength of Tarski's account is that it specifies the extension of 'true' for a given language (as expressed in a richer meta-language).

Related Idea

Idea 19145 We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]

The 32 ideas from 'Truth and Predication'

19131 We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19133 If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
19132 Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
19136 Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
19139 Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
19147 Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
19140 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson]
19151 Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
19144 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
19148 There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
19150 Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
19145 We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
19146 Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
19142 Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson]
19149 If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19152 Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
19154 The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
19153 Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
19156 Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
19158 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
19161 We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]
19162 Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
19163 You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
19160 A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
19166 The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
19167 Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
19174 Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
19170 Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
19173 Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
19176 The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
19172 To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
19169 Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson]