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Single Idea 19148
[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
]
Full Idea
The real objection to the correspondence theory of truth is that there is nothing interesting or instructive to which true sentences correspond. (C.I. Lewis challenged defenders to locate the fact or part of reality to which a truth corresponded).
Gist of Idea
There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to
Source
Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.39
A Reaction
Davidson defended a correspondence view in 'True to the Facts'. Davidson evidently also thinks the same objection applies to claims about truthmakers. If you say 'gold is shiny', the gold is very dispersed, but it is still there.
The
32 ideas
from 'Truth and Predication'
19131
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We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts
[Davidson]
|
19133
|
If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole
[Davidson]
|
19132
|
Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage
[Davidson]
|
19136
|
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
[Davidson]
|
19139
|
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
[Davidson]
|
19147
|
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
[Davidson]
|
19148
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There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to
[Davidson]
|
19140
|
'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference
[Davidson]
|
19151
|
Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard
[Davidson]
|
19144
|
'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify
[Davidson]
|
19150
|
Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief
[Davidson]
|
19145
|
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth
[Davidson]
|
19146
|
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference?
[Davidson]
|
19142
|
Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature
[Davidson]
|
19149
|
If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations'
[Davidson]
|
19152
|
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker
[Davidson]
|
19154
|
The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants
[Davidson]
|
19153
|
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler
[Davidson]
|
19156
|
Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places
[Davidson]
|
19158
|
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human'
[Davidson]
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19161
|
We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth
[Davidson]
|
19160
|
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication
[Davidson]
|
19162
|
Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed
[Davidson]
|
19163
|
You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it
[Davidson]
|
19166
|
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence
[Davidson]
|
19167
|
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing
[Davidson]
|
19173
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Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
[Davidson]
|
19174
|
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths
[Davidson]
|
19170
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Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
[Davidson]
|
19172
|
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
[Davidson]
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19169
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Predicates are a source of generality in sentences
[Davidson]
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19176
|
The concept of truth can explain predication
[Davidson]
|