more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 19168
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
]
Full Idea
Real functions map objects onto objects, but concepts map objects onto truth value, ...so Dummett says that concepts are not functions, but that they have a 'functional character'.
Gist of Idea
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects
Source
report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 6
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.136
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[concepts as meanings, distinct from a word's reference]:
|
9839
|
Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
|
9947
|
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions
[Frege, by George/Velleman]
|
|
10319
|
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object
[Frege, by Hale]
|
|
8488
|
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value
[Frege]
|
|
9190
|
A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
|
13665
|
Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic
[Frege, by Shapiro]
|
|
13878
|
Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates
[Frege, by Wright,C]
|
|
7736
|
A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object
[Frege, by Weiner]
|
|
17430
|
Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability
[Frege, by Koslicki]
|
|
8622
|
Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth
[Frege]
|
|
18752
|
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object
[Frege, by McGee]
|
|
19168
|
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects
[Dummett, by Davidson]
|
|
11836
|
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense
[Wiggins]
|
|
12637
|
Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference
[Fodor]
|
|
12638
|
If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers
[Fodor]
|
|
12639
|
Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes
[Fodor]
|
|
12605
|
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference
[Peacocke]
|
|
12607
|
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions
[Peacocke]
|
|
13475
|
The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest
[Hart,WD]
|
|
22290
|
The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated
[Potter]
|