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Single Idea 19170
[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
]
Full Idea
It is clearly a mistake to call Tarski a disquotationalist. ...We say of a sentence not at hand (such as 'You gave the right answer to this question last night, but I can't remember what you said') that it is true or false.
Gist of Idea
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
Source
Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.150
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[truth has no nature, and refers to nothing]:
1564
|
True and false statements can use exactly the same words
[Anon (Diss)]
|
19185
|
Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems
[Tarski]
|
4749
|
We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted
[Ayer]
|
12129
|
'Truth' may only apply within a theory
[Kuhn]
|
19170
|
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
[Davidson]
|
23287
|
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language
[Davidson]
|
8819
|
We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning
[Pollock]
|
23299
|
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences
[Horwich, by Davidson]
|
6336
|
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth
[Horwich]
|
6337
|
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory
[Horwich]
|
6344
|
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them
[Horwich]
|
9921
|
'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'
[Burgess/Rosen]
|
4753
|
Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions
[Engel]
|
4755
|
Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons
[Engel]
|
14419
|
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth
[Merricks]
|
12437
|
Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit
[Azzouni]
|
15325
|
Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept
[Horsten]
|
15344
|
Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth
[Horsten]
|
15356
|
Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws
[Horsten]
|
15358
|
Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true
[Horsten]
|
15359
|
Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property
[Horsten]
|
15368
|
This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference
[Horsten]
|
18347
|
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property
[Rami]
|
19098
|
Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories
[Misak]
|
19104
|
Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language
[Misak]
|
16338
|
Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge
[Halbach]
|
16316
|
Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations
[Halbach]
|
16317
|
The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them
[Halbach]
|
16319
|
Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism
[Halbach]
|
16320
|
Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory
[Halbach]
|
15656
|
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions
[Halbach]
|
19075
|
Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions
[Young,JO]
|