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Single Idea 19172
[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
]
Full Idea
When we enquire whether a truth definition defines the class of true sentences in a particular language, we are thinking of the truth definition as stipulating a possible language.
Gist of Idea
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
Source
Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.153
A Reaction
Thus I might say "Nij wonk yang" is true if and only if snow is white, and make my first step towards a new language. An interesting way of looking at Tarski's project.
The
35 ideas
with the same theme
[significance of formal defintions of linguistic truth]:
10824
|
If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs
[Field,H on Tarski]
|
16303
|
Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
19134
|
Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages
[Davidson on Tarski]
|
16304
|
Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction
[Halbach on Tarski]
|
10969
|
Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth
[Tarski, by Read]
|
17746
|
Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics
[Tarski, by Walicki]
|
10821
|
Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it
[Tarski, by Field,H]
|
10904
|
Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences
[Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
|
2571
|
Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics
[Tarski, by Haack]
|
10822
|
A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory
[Field,H on Tarski]
|
9012
|
Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences
[Quine]
|
10841
|
The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement
[Strawson,P]
|
6264
|
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language
[Putnam]
|
6265
|
Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept
[Putnam]
|
6269
|
Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true'
[Putnam]
|
2345
|
Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation
[Putnam]
|
3744
|
The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions
[O'Connor]
|
3749
|
What does 'true in English' mean?
[O'Connor]
|
8166
|
Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth
[Dummett]
|
19171
|
Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means
[Dummett, by Davidson]
|
19139
|
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
[Davidson]
|
19136
|
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
[Davidson]
|
19147
|
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
[Davidson]
|
19172
|
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
[Davidson]
|
15343
|
Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models)
[Kripke, by Horsten]
|
15327
|
Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories
[Kripke, by Horsten]
|
10017
|
Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth
[Hodes]
|
10018
|
Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language
[Hodes]
|
19320
|
If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite
[Kirkham]
|
14968
|
A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate
[Gupta]
|
13503
|
A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth
[Hart,WD]
|
10170
|
While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be
[Reck/Price]
|
19205
|
'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white
[Merricks]
|
16337
|
Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power
[Halbach]
|
19127
|
The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative
[Halbach/Leigh]
|