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Single Idea 19173

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets ]

Full Idea

'Theaetetus is a member of the set of seated objects' doesn't mention the predicate 'sits', but has a new predicate 'is a member of', with no given semantic role. We are back with Plato's problem with the predicate 'instantiates'.

Gist of Idea

Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help

Source

Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.158

A Reaction

Plato's problem is the 'third man' problem - a regress in the explanation. In other words, if we are trying to explain predication, treating predicates as sets gets us nowhere. Just as I always thought. But you have to want explanations.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [properties are just classes of certain objects]:

21575 When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
9127 Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
15478 Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
12672 Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
19173 Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
9783 While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
15399 The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
15732 Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
15733 Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
15734 If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
9655 Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
9653 It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
10723 A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
16290 I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
15516 A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
4038 Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
14499 Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
7703 If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
18511 Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
10591 Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro]
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]