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Single Idea 19173
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
]
Full Idea
'Theaetetus is a member of the set of seated objects' doesn't mention the predicate 'sits', but has a new predicate 'is a member of', with no given semantic role. We are back with Plato's problem with the predicate 'instantiates'.
Gist of Idea
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
Source
Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.158
A Reaction
Plato's problem is the 'third man' problem - a regress in the explanation. In other words, if we are trying to explain predication, treating predicates as sets gets us nowhere. Just as I always thought. But you have to want explanations.
The
32 ideas
from 'Truth and Predication'
19131
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We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts
[Davidson]
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19133
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If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole
[Davidson]
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19132
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Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage
[Davidson]
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19136
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Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
[Davidson]
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19139
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Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
[Davidson]
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19147
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Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
[Davidson]
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19148
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There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to
[Davidson]
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19140
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'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference
[Davidson]
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19151
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Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard
[Davidson]
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19144
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'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify
[Davidson]
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19150
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Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief
[Davidson]
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19145
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We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth
[Davidson]
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19146
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Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference?
[Davidson]
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19142
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Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature
[Davidson]
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19149
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If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations'
[Davidson]
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19152
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Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker
[Davidson]
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19154
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The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants
[Davidson]
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19153
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Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler
[Davidson]
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19156
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Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places
[Davidson]
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19158
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'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human'
[Davidson]
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19161
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We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth
[Davidson]
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19160
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A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication
[Davidson]
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19162
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Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed
[Davidson]
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19163
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You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it
[Davidson]
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19166
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The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence
[Davidson]
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19167
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Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing
[Davidson]
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19173
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Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
[Davidson]
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19174
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Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths
[Davidson]
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19170
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Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
[Davidson]
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19172
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To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
[Davidson]
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19169
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Predicates are a source of generality in sentences
[Davidson]
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19176
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The concept of truth can explain predication
[Davidson]
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