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Single Idea 19178
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
]
Full Idea
The desired definition of truth does not aim to specify the meaning of a familiar word used to denote a novel notion; on the contrary, it aims to catch hold of the actual meaning of an old notion.
Gist of Idea
Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one
Source
Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 01)
Book Ref
'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Linsky,Leonard [University of Illinois 1972], p.13
A Reaction
Tarski refers back to Aristotle for an account of the 'old notion'. To many the definition of Tarski looks very weird, so it is important to see that he is trying to capture the original concept.
The
79 ideas
from Alfred Tarski
13335
|
Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth
[Tarski]
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13336
|
A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language
[Tarski]
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13337
|
A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules
[Tarski]
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13338
|
'"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth
[Tarski]
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13339
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A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned
[Tarski]
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13340
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Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it
[Tarski]
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13341
|
Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics
[Tarski]
|
18812
|
Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match
[Tarski, by Rumfitt]
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13344
|
X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X
[Tarski]
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13343
|
A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions
[Tarski]
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13345
|
Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them
[Tarski]
|
19179
|
For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language
[Tarski]
|
19178
|
Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one
[Tarski]
|
19177
|
A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct
[Tarski]
|
19180
|
It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified
[Tarski]
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19181
|
In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white
[Tarski]
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19183
|
Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction
[Tarski]
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19182
|
Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate'
[Tarski]
|
10824
|
If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs
[Field,H on Tarski]
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19184
|
The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects)
[Tarski]
|
19185
|
Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems
[Tarski]
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19186
|
A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language
[Tarski]
|
19187
|
The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously
[Tarski]
|
19188
|
We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed
[Tarski]
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19189
|
The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics
[Tarski]
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19190
|
We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms
[Tarski]
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19191
|
Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects
[Tarski]
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19192
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The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws)
[Tarski]
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19193
|
Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless
[Tarski]
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19194
|
We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms
[Tarski]
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19196
|
Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth
[Tarski]
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19195
|
Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions
[Tarski]
|
19197
|
Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims
[Tarski]
|
19198
|
We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true
[Tarski]
|
19199
|
Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects
[Tarski]
|
10152
|
Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying
[Tarski]
|
10151
|
I am a deeply convinced nominalist
[Tarski]
|
20407
|
Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful
[Tarski, by Schellekens]
|
17746
|
Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics
[Tarski, by Walicki]
|
10904
|
Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences
[Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
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2571
|
Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics
[Tarski, by Haack]
|
10821
|
Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it
[Tarski, by Field,H]
|
10822
|
A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory
[Field,H on Tarski]
|
10969
|
Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth
[Tarski, by Read]
|
18759
|
Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term
[Tarski, by McGee]
|
16323
|
The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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18756
|
Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions
[Tarski, by McGee]
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19313
|
Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth
[Tarski, by Kirkham]
|
10154
|
Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics
[Feferman/Feferman on Tarski]
|
8940
|
Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language
[Tarski, by Fisher]
|
16295
|
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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15342
|
Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox
[Tarski, by Horsten]
|
16306
|
Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
15410
|
Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it
[Burgess on Tarski]
|
18811
|
Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them
[Tarski, by Rumfitt]
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15365
|
We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects
[Tarski, by Horsten]
|
19314
|
For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic
[Tarski, by Kirkham]
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19316
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Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence
[Tarski, by Kirkham]
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19175
|
Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth
[Tarski, by Davidson]
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15339
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Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions
[Tarski, by Horsten]
|
16302
|
Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
19135
|
Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages
[Davidson on Tarski]
|
19138
|
Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning
[Davidson on Tarski]
|
4699
|
Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language
[Tarski, by O'Grady]
|
19324
|
Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs
[Kirkham on Tarski]
|
10672
|
Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence
[Tarski, by Hossack]
|
15322
|
Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate
[Tarski, by Horsten]
|
16296
|
Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
19134
|
Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages
[Davidson on Tarski]
|
16303
|
Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
16304
|
Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction
[Halbach on Tarski]
|
19069
|
'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless
[Tarski]
|
10823
|
A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function
[Tarski]
|
10157
|
Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory
[Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman]
|
19141
|
Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies
[Tarski, by Davidson]
|
10048
|
There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical
[Tarski]
|
10694
|
Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true
[Tarski, by Beall/Restall]
|
10479
|
Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations
[Tarski, by Hodges,W]
|
10153
|
In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical
[Tarski]
|