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Single Idea 19181

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition ]

Full Idea

If we base ourselves on the classical conception of truth, we shall say that the sentence 'snow is white' is true if snow is white, and it is false if snow is not white.

Gist of Idea

In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white

Source

Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 04)

Book Ref

'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Linsky,Leonard [University of Illinois 1972], p.15

A Reaction

I had not realised, prior to his, how closely Tarski is sticking to Aristotle's famous formulation of truth. The point is that you can only specify 'what is' using a language. Putting 'true' in the metalanguage gives specific content to Aristotle.

Related Idea

Idea 586 Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]

The 27 ideas with the same theme [truth defined for formal languages, using 'satisfaction']:

21752 Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability [Gödel, by Quine]
13338 '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski]
19180 It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski]
19181 In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski]
19183 Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski]
19182 Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski]
19196 Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski]
19198 We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski]
15339 Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten]
16302 Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach]
19135 Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski]
19138 Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski]
4699 Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady]
19324 Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski]
10672 Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack]
10844 The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
18951 For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam]
2570 The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack]
13499 Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD]
10818 Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H]
14965 Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta]
10353 Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch]
15340 Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten]
15354 Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten]
19101 Disquotation is bivalent [Misak]
19096 Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak]
19106 Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak]