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Single Idea 19182

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition ]

Full Idea

We wish to use the term 'true' in such a way that all the equivalences of the form (T) [i.e. X is true iff p] can be asserted, and we shall call a definition of truth 'adequate' if all these equivalences follow from it.

Gist of Idea

Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate'

Source

Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 04)

Book Ref

'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Linsky,Leonard [University of Illinois 1972], p.16

A Reaction

The interpretation of Tarski's theory is difficult. From this I'm thinking that 'true' is simply being defined as 'assertible'. This is the status of each line in a logical proof, if there is a semantic dimension to the proof (and not mere syntax).

Related Ideas

Idea 19177 A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]

Idea 19198 We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski]

The 24 ideas from 'The Semantic Conception of Truth'

19179 For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski]
19178 Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
19177 A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
19180 It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski]
19181 In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski]
19183 Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski]
19182 Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski]
10824 If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski]
19184 The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
19185 Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski]
19186 A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
19187 The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski]
19188 We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski]
19189 The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski]
19190 We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski]
19191 Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
19192 The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski]
19194 We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
19193 Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski]
19196 Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski]
19195 Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski]
19197 Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski]
19198 We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski]
19199 Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski]