more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
In a 'semantically closed' language all sentences which determine the adequate usage of 'true' can be asserted in the language. ...We can't change our logic, so we reject such languages. ...So must use two different languages to discuss truth.
Gist of Idea
We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed
Source
Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 08-09)
Book Ref
'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Linsky,Leonard [University of Illinois 1972], p.20
A Reaction
This section explains why a meta-language is required. It rests entirely on the existence of the Liar paradox is a semantically closed language.
| 19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
| 19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
| 19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
| 15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
| 16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |