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Single Idea 19189

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth ]

Full Idea

Every sentence which occurs in the object language must also occur in the metalanguage, or can be translated into the metalanguage. There must also be logical terms, ...and semantic terms can only be introduced in the metalanguage by definition.

Gist of Idea

The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics

Source

Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 09)

Book Ref

'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Linsky,Leonard [University of Illinois 1972], p.22


A Reaction

He suggest that if the languages are 'typed', the meta-languag, to be 'richer', must contain variables of a higher logica type. Does this mean second-order logic?


The 9 ideas with the same theme [using a separate language to define truth]:

We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski]
The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski]
The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy]
Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten]
Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach]
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]