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Single Idea 19191

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth ]

Full Idea

To define satisfaction we indicate which objects satisfy the simplest sentential functions, then state the conditions for compound functions. This applies automatically to sentences (with no free variables) so a true sentence is satisfied by all objects.

Gist of Idea

Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects

Source

Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 11)

Book Ref

'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Linsky,Leonard [University of Illinois 1972], p.25


A Reaction

I presume nothing in the domain of objects can conflict with a sentence that has been satisfied by some of them, so 'all' the objects satisfy the sentence. Tarski doesn't use the word 'domain'. Basic satisfaction seems to be stipulated.

Related Idea

Idea 19174 Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]


The 18 ideas with the same theme ['satisfaction' as a means of defining truth]:

An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell]
The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro]
If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]