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Single Idea 19205

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth ]

Full Idea

It is contingently true that 'snow is white' expresses the proposition that snow is white.

Gist of Idea

'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white

Source

Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.V n14)

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Propositions' [OUP 2015], p.25


A Reaction

Tarski stuck to sentences, but Merricks rightly argues that truth concerns propositions, not sentences. Sentences are subservient entities - mere tools used to express what matters, which is our thoughts (say I).


The 17 ideas from 'Propositions'

Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]
In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]