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Single Idea 19210
[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
]
Full Idea
The standard view among philosophers nowadays seems to be that propositions do not and even cannot change in truth-value. But my own view is that some propositions can, and do, change in truth value.
Gist of Idea
The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value
Source
Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 3.VII)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Propositions' [OUP 2015], p.113
A Reaction
He gives 'that A sits' as an example of one which can change, though 'that A sits at time t' cannot change. I take Merricks to be obviously right, and cannot get my head round the 'standard' view. What on earth do they think a proposition is?
The
17 ideas
from 'Propositions'
19200
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Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured
[Merricks]
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19201
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Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it
[Merricks]
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19202
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Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things
[Merricks]
|
19203
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A sentence's truth conditions depend on context
[Merricks]
|
19204
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True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought
[Merricks]
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19205
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'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white
[Merricks]
|
19207
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Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets
[Merricks]
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19206
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'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition
[Merricks]
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19209
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Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem
[Merricks]
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19208
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The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists'
[Merricks]
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19210
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The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value
[Merricks]
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19211
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Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs
[Merricks]
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19212
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Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones?
[Merricks]
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19213
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We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition
[Merricks]
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19214
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In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person
[Merricks]
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19217
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I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity
[Merricks]
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19215
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Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens
[Merricks]
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