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Single Idea 19211
[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
]
Full Idea
I describe Russell's 1903 account of propositions as the view that each proposition is identical with the state of affairs that makes that proposition true. That is, a proposition is identical with its 'truthmaking' state of affairs.
Gist of Idea
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs
Source
Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.II)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Propositions' [OUP 2015], p.124
A Reaction
Russell soon gave this view up (false propositions proving tricky), and I'm amazed anyone takes it seriously. I take it as axiomatic that if there were no minds there would be no propositions. Was the Big Bang a set of propositions?
The
14 ideas
with the same theme
[propositions as made of real objects]:
21726
|
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance
[Russell]
|
21702
|
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts'
[Russell, by Quine]
|
23453
|
Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one
[Russell/Whitehead]
|
19164
|
If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable
[Davidson on Russell]
|
22302
|
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts
[Moore,GE, by Potter]
|
9085
|
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths
[Plantinga]
|
16446
|
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist
[Stalnaker]
|
14616
|
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations
[Stalnaker]
|
19216
|
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist
[Williamson]
|
17702
|
Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components
[Mares]
|
19201
|
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it
[Merricks]
|
19211
|
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs
[Merricks]
|
21662
|
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking?
[Hofweber]
|
16380
|
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication
[Recanati]
|