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Single Idea 19211
[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
]
Full Idea
I describe Russell's 1903 account of propositions as the view that each proposition is identical with the state of affairs that makes that proposition true. That is, a proposition is identical with its 'truthmaking' state of affairs.
Gist of Idea
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs
Source
Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.II)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Propositions' [OUP 2015], p.124
A Reaction
Russell soon gave this view up (false propositions proving tricky), and I'm amazed anyone takes it seriously. I take it as axiomatic that if there were no minds there would be no propositions. Was the Big Bang a set of propositions?
The
73 ideas
from Trenton Merricks
17960
|
Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real
[Merricks]
|
17961
|
Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart
[Merricks, by PG]
|
14229
|
Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics
[Merricks, by Liggins]
|
6123
|
Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour
[Merricks]
|
6124
|
I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist
[Merricks]
|
6130
|
'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object
[Merricks]
|
6125
|
We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples
[Merricks]
|
6128
|
Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region
[Merricks]
|
6127
|
'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing
[Merricks]
|
6131
|
Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things
[Merricks]
|
6132
|
Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts
[Merricks]
|
6133
|
If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy
[Merricks]
|
6134
|
Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts?
[Merricks]
|
6135
|
A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent
[Merricks]
|
6136
|
Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox
[Merricks]
|
6138
|
It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located
[Merricks]
|
6137
|
Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing)
[Merricks]
|
6140
|
Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons
[Merricks]
|
6141
|
There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise
[Merricks]
|
6143
|
Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time
[Merricks]
|
6142
|
The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways
[Merricks]
|
6144
|
You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software
[Merricks]
|
6145
|
Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists
[Merricks]
|
6146
|
Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties
[Merricks]
|
6147
|
The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties
[Merricks]
|
6148
|
Human organisms can exercise downward causation
[Merricks]
|
6149
|
Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice
[Merricks]
|
6150
|
The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge
[Merricks]
|
14472
|
If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it
[Merricks, by Thomasson]
|
14469
|
Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage
[Merricks]
|
19200
|
Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured
[Merricks]
|
19202
|
Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things
[Merricks]
|
19201
|
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it
[Merricks]
|
19203
|
A sentence's truth conditions depend on context
[Merricks]
|
19204
|
True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought
[Merricks]
|
19205
|
'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white
[Merricks]
|
19207
|
Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets
[Merricks]
|
19206
|
'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition
[Merricks]
|
19209
|
Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem
[Merricks]
|
19208
|
The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists'
[Merricks]
|
19210
|
The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value
[Merricks]
|
19211
|
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs
[Merricks]
|
19212
|
Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones?
[Merricks]
|
19213
|
We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition
[Merricks]
|
19214
|
In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person
[Merricks]
|
19217
|
I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity
[Merricks]
|
19215
|
Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens
[Merricks]
|
14390
|
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth
[Merricks]
|
14391
|
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something
[Merricks]
|
14392
|
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified
[Merricks]
|
14393
|
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths
[Merricks]
|
14394
|
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things
[Merricks]
|
14395
|
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true
[Merricks]
|
14396
|
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths
[Merricks]
|
14397
|
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients
[Merricks]
|
14398
|
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it
[Merricks]
|
14400
|
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being
[Merricks]
|
14402
|
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker
[Merricks]
|
14403
|
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core
[Merricks]
|
14406
|
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous
[Merricks]
|
14407
|
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist'
[Merricks]
|
14405
|
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed?
[Merricks]
|
14408
|
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear
[Merricks]
|
14410
|
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs
[Merricks]
|
14411
|
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it
[Merricks]
|
14412
|
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false
[Merricks]
|
14414
|
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me?
[Merricks]
|
14413
|
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed
[Merricks]
|
14415
|
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it
[Merricks]
|
14416
|
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false
[Merricks]
|
14417
|
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base
[Merricks]
|
14418
|
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property
[Merricks]
|
14419
|
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth
[Merricks]
|