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Single Idea 19211

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions ]

Full Idea

I describe Russell's 1903 account of propositions as the view that each proposition is identical with the state of affairs that makes that proposition true. That is, a proposition is identical with its 'truthmaking' state of affairs.

Gist of Idea

Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs

Source

Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.II)

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Propositions' [OUP 2015], p.124


A Reaction

Russell soon gave this view up (false propositions proving tricky), and I'm amazed anyone takes it seriously. I take it as axiomatic that if there were no minds there would be no propositions. Was the Big Bang a set of propositions?


The 17 ideas from 'Propositions'

Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]
In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]