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Single Idea 19217
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
]
Full Idea
The Aboutness Assumption says that necessarily, if a proposition is directly about an entity, then that proposition stands in a relation to the entity. I shall argue that the Assumption is false.
Gist of Idea
I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity
Source
Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.VII)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Propositions' [OUP 2015], p.186
A Reaction
This feels sort of right, though the nature of aboutness remains elusive. He cites denials of existence. I take speech to be fairly internal, even though its main role is communication. Maybe its a Cambridge relation, as far as the entity is concerned.
The
30 ideas
with the same theme
[how one thing can represent another thing]:
19087
|
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to
[Peirce]
|
6112
|
Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types
[Russell]
|
23450
|
Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world
[Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
|
13978
|
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic
[Ryle]
|
8898
|
Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence
[Quine]
|
1626
|
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component
[Quine]
|
6282
|
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference
[Putnam]
|
2346
|
Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference
[Putnam]
|
15667
|
To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable
[Habermas]
|
21932
|
'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign
[Derrida, by Glendinning]
|
21930
|
For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language
[Derrida]
|
21933
|
Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent
[Derrida, by Glendinning]
|
21894
|
Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language
[Derrida]
|
21886
|
Meanings depend on differences and contrasts
[Derrida]
|
21884
|
Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language
[Derrida]
|
21935
|
The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences
[Derrida]
|
2565
|
Nature has no preferred way of being represented
[Rorty]
|
6387
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A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth
[Davidson]
|
3451
|
Meaning is derived intentionality
[Searle]
|
3078
|
Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory
[Harman]
|
13948
|
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have
[Cartwright,R]
|
13950
|
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter
[Cartwright,R]
|
2517
|
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it
[Katz]
|
16406
|
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean
[Stalnaker]
|
2439
|
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences
[Fodor]
|
2457
|
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs
[Fodor]
|
7324
|
Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together?
[Miller,A]
|
19217
|
I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity
[Merricks]
|
21654
|
The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent
[Hofweber]
|
14717
|
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation
[Schroeter]
|