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Single Idea 19223
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
]
Full Idea
'Full belief' is willingness to upon a proposition in vital crises, 'opinion' is willingness to act on it in relatively insignificant affairs. But pure science has nothing at all to do with action.
Gist of Idea
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)
Book Ref
Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things', ed/tr. Ketner,K.L. [Harvard 1992], p.112
A Reaction
A nice clear statement of the pragmatic view of beliefs. It is not much help in distinguishing full belief about the solar system from mere opinion about remote galaxies. Ditto for historical events.
The
25 ideas
with the same theme
[the purpose or aim of beliefs]:
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2050
|
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false
[Plato]
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4391
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Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth
[Aristotle]
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1685
|
No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true
[Aristotle]
|
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14050
|
We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes
[Epicurus]
|
|
9100
|
Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true
[William of Ockham]
|
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6940
|
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions
[Peirce]
|
|
6941
|
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false
[Peirce]
|
|
6942
|
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true
[Peirce]
|
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6943
|
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt
[Peirce]
|
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14781
|
A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed
[Peirce]
|
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19223
|
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions
[Peirce]
|
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4485
|
Every belief is a considering-something-true
[Nietzsche]
|
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6672
|
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false'
[Moore,GE, by Lowe]
|
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3212
|
Beliefs are maps by which we steer
[Ramsey]
|
|
6600
|
The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns
[Wittgenstein]
|
|
3816
|
Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
[Searle]
|
|
3833
|
A belief is a commitment to truth
[Searle]
|
|
3837
|
We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
[Searle]
|
|
19308
|
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it
[Harman]
|
|
3570
|
Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth
[Nozick, by Williams,M]
|
|
6783
|
To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate
[Fraassen, by Bird]
|
|
4760
|
Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing
[Williamson]
|
|
4754
|
Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires
[Engel]
|
|
19525
|
If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right)
[Conee/Feldman]
|
|
15372
|
Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true
[Horsten]
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