more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 19227
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
]
Full Idea
Philosophy differs from mathematics in being a search for real truth.
Gist of Idea
Philosophy is a search for real truth
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)
Book Ref
Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things', ed/tr. Ketner,K.L. [Harvard 1992], p.115
A Reaction
This is important, coming from the founder of pragmatism, in rejecting the anti-realism which a lot of modern pragmatists seem to like.
The
40 ideas
from 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things'
19227
|
Philosophy is a search for real truth
[Peirce]
|
19218
|
Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic
[Peirce]
|
19229
|
Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types
[Peirce]
|
19219
|
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard
[Peirce]
|
19231
|
Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics
[Peirce]
|
19228
|
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence
[Peirce]
|
19226
|
We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts
[Peirce]
|
19223
|
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions
[Peirce]
|
19224
|
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it
[Peirce]
|
19225
|
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below
[Peirce]
|
19222
|
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons
[Peirce]
|
19220
|
We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes!
[Peirce]
|
19230
|
People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power
[Peirce]
|
19221
|
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial
[Peirce]
|
19233
|
Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around
[Peirce]
|
19234
|
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general
[Peirce]
|
19236
|
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions
[Peirce]
|
19232
|
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true
[Peirce]
|
19235
|
How does induction get started?
[Peirce]
|
19238
|
The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes)
[Peirce]
|
19240
|
Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning
[Peirce]
|
19239
|
There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything
[Peirce]
|
19241
|
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems
[Peirce]
|
19237
|
Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true
[Peirce]
|
19242
|
Generalization is the true end of life
[Peirce]
|
19245
|
We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study
[Peirce]
|
19244
|
Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless
[Peirce]
|
19243
|
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble
[Peirce]
|
19247
|
The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth
[Peirce]
|
19246
|
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory
[Peirce]
|
19250
|
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged
[Peirce]
|
19251
|
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample
[Peirce]
|
19249
|
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you
[Peirce]
|
19248
|
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation
[Peirce]
|
19252
|
Objective chance is the property of a distribution
[Peirce]
|
19255
|
Generalisation is the great law of mind
[Peirce]
|
19254
|
Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution
[Peirce]
|
19253
|
We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance
[Peirce]
|
19257
|
Whatever is First must be sentient
[Peirce]
|
19256
|
Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing
[Peirce]
|