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Single Idea 19228

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly ]

Full Idea

Philosophy differs from the special sciences in not confining itself to the reality of existence, but also to the reality of potential being.

Gist of Idea

Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things', ed/tr. Ketner,K.L. [Harvard 1992], p.115

A Reaction

One might reply that sciences also concern potential being, if their output is universal generalisations (such as 'laws'). I take disposition and powers to be central to existence, which are hence of interest to sciences.

Related Idea

Idea 16127 Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe]

The 40 ideas from 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things'

19218 Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
19228 Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
19227 Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
19219 Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
19229 Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
19231 Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
19226 We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
19223 We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
19225 I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
19222 Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
19220 We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
19224 Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
19221 Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
19230 People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
19233 Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
19234 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
19235 How does induction get started? [Peirce]
19236 Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
19232 In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
19242 Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
19240 Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
19239 There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
19237 Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
19238 The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
19241 An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
19247 The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
19246 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
19243 If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
19245 We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
19244 Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
19248 Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
19249 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
19251 The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
19250 Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
19252 Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
19253 We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
19255 Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
19254 Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
19256 Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]
19257 Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]