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Full Idea
In our ordinary use of language we always understand the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the antecedent shall be true.
Gist of Idea
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II)
Book Ref
Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things', ed/tr. Ketner,K.L. [Harvard 1992], p.126
A Reaction
Peirce is discussing Diodorus, and proposes the view nowadays defended by Edgington, though in the end Peirce defends the standard material conditional as simpler. I suspect that this discussion by Peirce is not well known.
| 19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
| 14279 | Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey] |
| 22432 | Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine] |
| 15722 | Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine] |
| 14282 | On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington] |
| 13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington] |