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Single Idea 19246
[filed under theme 3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
]
Full Idea
Whether or not 'truth' has two meanings, I think 'holding for true' has two kinds. One is practical holding for true which alone is entitled to the name of Belief; the other is the acceptance of a proposition, which in pure science is always provisional.
Gist of Idea
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV)
Book Ref
Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things', ed/tr. Ketner,K.L. [Harvard 1992], p.178
A Reaction
The problem here seems to be that we can act on a proposition without wholly believing it, like walking across thin ice.
The
24 ideas
with the same theme
[truth as the aim of enquiry]:
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19571
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Delusion and truth differ in their life functions
[Novalis]
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7661
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Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators
[Peirce]
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15335
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Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us?
[Horsten on Peirce]
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14796
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Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry
[Peirce]
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19246
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'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory
[Peirce]
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19095
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Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry
[Peirce, by Misak]
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19097
|
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful
[Peirce, by Misak]
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21494
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If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely?
[Atkin on Peirce]
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22305
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If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true
[James]
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18984
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True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise)
[James]
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7616
|
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability
[Putnam]
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8828
|
Truth is rational acceptability
[Putnam]
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2549
|
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality
[Rorty]
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22665
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Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature
[Nozick]
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3884
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The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth
[Scruton]
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6627
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Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth
[Stich, by Lowe]
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19086
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Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible?
[Macbeth]
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15336
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The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B
[Horsten]
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19094
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For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible
[Misak]
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19100
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Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling
[Misak]
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19099
|
'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence...
[Misak]
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19103
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'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it
[Misak]
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19105
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Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries
[Misak]
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19108
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Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards
[Misak]
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