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Single Idea 19248

[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality ]

Full Idea

The mental operations concerning in reasoning are three. The first is Observation; the second is Experimentation; and the third is Habituation.

Gist of Idea

Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things', ed/tr. Ketner,K.L. [Harvard 1992], p.182


A Reaction

I like the breadth of this. Even those who think scientific reasoning has priority over logic (as I do, thinking of it as the evaluation of evidence, with Sherlock Holmes as its role model) will be surprised to finding observation and habituation there.


The 40 ideas from 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things'

Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]
Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]