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Single Idea 19256

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic ]

Full Idea

Every attempt to understand anything at least hopes that the very objects of study themselves are subject to a logic more or less identical with that which we employ.

Gist of Idea

Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VIII)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things', ed/tr. Ketner,K.L. [Harvard 1992], p.257


A Reaction

The idea that external objects might be subject to a logic has become very unfashionable since Frege, but I love the idea. I'm inclined to think that we derive our logic from the world, so I'm a bit more confident that Peirce.


The 40 ideas from 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things'

Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]
Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]