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Single Idea 19261

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding ]

Full Idea

What is distinctive about understanding (after truth is satisfied) is the internal seeing or appreciating of explanatory and other coherence-inducing relationships in a body of information that is crucial for understanding.

Gist of Idea

Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information

Source

Jonathan Kvanvig (The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding [2003], 198), quoted by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence 'Distinction'

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophia' [-], p.816


A Reaction

For me this ticks exactly the right boxes. Coherent explanations are what we want. The hardest part is the ensure their truth. Kvanvig claims this is internal, so we can understand even if, Gettier-style, our external connections are lucky.

Related Idea

Idea 19265 Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]


The 10 ideas from Jonathan Kvanvig

Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]