more on this theme | more from this text
Full Idea
A representation cannot accidentally be about an object. Aboutness is in general an intentional relation.
Gist of Idea
Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental
Source
Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Objections')
Book Ref
-: 'Philosophia' [-], p.326
A Reaction
'Intentional' with a 't', not with an 's'. This strikes me as important. Critics dislike the idea of 'representation' because if you passively place a representation and its subject together, what makes the image do the representing job? Answer: I do!
| 19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |