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Full Idea
The disjunctive belief that 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona', which Smith believes, derives its justification from the left disjunct, and its truth from the right disjunct.
Gist of Idea
In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other
Source
Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application')
Book Ref
-: 'Philosophia' [-], p.830
A Reaction
The example is from Gettier's original article. Have we finally got a decent account of the original Gettier problem, after fifty years of debate? Philosophical moves with delightful slowness.
Related Idea
Idea 19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |