more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 19272

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy ]

Full Idea

If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of pain which I do not feel.

Gist of Idea

To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel

Source

Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §302)

Book Ref

Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Philosophical Investigations', ed/tr. Anscombe,E. [Blackwell 1972], p.101


A Reaction

I just don't feel a deep problem here. Wittgenstein didn't know about mirror neurons, which trigger in me a reaction like the one causing your behaviour.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [knowing other minds as like our own mind]:

I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill]
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell]
It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein]
To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein]
If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm]
I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB]
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J]
You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J]
The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling]
Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin]