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Single Idea 19274

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity ]

Full Idea

A well-known objection to Hume's analysis of causation is that he presupposes necessary connections between mental events in the theory.

Gist of Idea

Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events

Source

comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Saul A. Kripke - Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language n 87

Book Ref

Kripke,Saul: 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language' [Blackwell 1993], p.146


A Reaction

Are these the associations that occur within the mind? I'm not clear about the objection, but record it for interest.


The 31 ideas with the same theme [causation as necessitated by nature]:

When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle]
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]
A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes]
From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza]
In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche]
A true cause must involve a necessary connection between cause and effect [Malebranche]
Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz]
The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz]
Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume]
Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G]
In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume]
That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume]
Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume]
Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant]
A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill]
The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer]
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]
Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis]
Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis]
A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis]
Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel]
For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]
Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa]
The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa]
Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe]
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum]
We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum]
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson]