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Full Idea
An old objection to conventionalism claims that it confuses sentences with propositions, confusing what makes sentences mean what they do with what makes them (as propositions) true.
Gist of Idea
Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed
Source
Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 05.2)
Book Ref
Hale,Bob: 'Necessary Beings' [OUP 2013], p.120
A Reaction
The conventions would presumably apply to the sentences, but not to the propositions. Since I think that focusing on propositions solves a lot of misunderstandings in modern philosophy, I like the sound of this.
| 13251 | Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap] |
| 18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
| 12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
| 20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
| 8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
| 8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
| 9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
| 19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |