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Single Idea 19294

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence ]

Full Idea

If the essentialist theory of necessity is to be adequate, it must be able to explain how the existence of certain objects - such as the natural numbers - can itself be absolutely necessary.

Gist of Idea

If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences?

Source

Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 07.1)

Book Ref

Hale,Bob: 'Necessary Beings' [OUP 2013], p.165


A Reaction

Hale and his neo-logicist pals think that numbers are 'objects', and they necessarily exist, so he obviously has a problem. I don't see any alternative for essentialists to treating the existing (and possible) natures as brute facts.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [necessity comes from the essence of actual things]:

The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis]
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis]
Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil]
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]