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Single Idea 19306
[filed under theme 2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
]
Full Idea
I am assuming the following principle: Clutter Avoidance - in reasoning, one should not clutter one's mind with trivialities.
Gist of Idea
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities
Source
Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2)
Book Ref
Harman,Gilbert: 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' [MIP 1986], p.12
A Reaction
I like Harman's interest in the psychology of reasoning. In the world of Frege, it is taboo to talk about psychology.
The
70 ideas
from Gilbert Harman
19305
|
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence
[Harman]
|
19304
|
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic
[Harman]
|
19303
|
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views
[Harman]
|
19307
|
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it
[Harman]
|
19309
|
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate
[Harman]
|
19306
|
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities
[Harman]
|
19308
|
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it
[Harman]
|
19310
|
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions
[Harman]
|
19311
|
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence
[Harman]
|
19312
|
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another
[Harman]
|
12588
|
Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality
[Harman]
|
12589
|
Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter
[Harman]
|
12590
|
Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication
[Harman]
|
12591
|
Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication
[Harman]
|
12592
|
Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication
[Harman]
|
12593
|
The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences
[Harman]
|
12594
|
If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one?
[Harman]
|
12596
|
Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence
[Harman]
|
12595
|
We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning
[Harman]
|
12597
|
I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely
[Harman]
|
12598
|
Reality is the overlap of true complete theories
[Harman]
|
12599
|
Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them
[Harman]
|
12600
|
The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts
[Harman]
|
12601
|
The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter
[Harman]
|
12602
|
There is no natural border between inner and outer
[Harman]
|
12603
|
We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world
[Harman]
|
5120
|
What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values
[Harman]
|
5121
|
Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it
[Harman]
|
8800
|
If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects
[Harman, by Sosa]
|
17060
|
Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology
[Harman, by Smart]
|
8130
|
Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism')
[Harman, by Burge]
|
5122
|
Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it
[Harman]
|
5123
|
Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it
[Harman]
|
5124
|
If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait
[Harman]
|
5125
|
Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character
[Harman]
|
6950
|
You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies
[Harman]
|
6951
|
Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are
[Harman]
|
6953
|
All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication
[Harman]
|
6952
|
Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it
[Harman]
|
6955
|
Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation
[Harman]
|
6954
|
A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs
[Harman]
|
6369
|
In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons
[Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
|
3073
|
We see ourselves in the world as a map
[Harman]
|
3074
|
People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious
[Harman]
|
3075
|
Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern?
[Harman]
|
3076
|
Defining dispositions is circular
[Harman]
|
3077
|
Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge
[Harman]
|
3078
|
Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory
[Harman]
|
3079
|
Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions
[Harman]
|
3080
|
Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements
[Harman]
|
3081
|
A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form
[Harman]
|
3082
|
Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form
[Harman]
|
3083
|
Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely
[Harman]
|
3084
|
Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts
[Harman]
|
3085
|
Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition
[Harman]
|
3087
|
The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary
[Harman]
|
3086
|
Are there any meanings apart from in a language?
[Harman]
|
3088
|
Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination
[Harman]
|
3089
|
Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic
[Harman]
|
3090
|
There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning
[Harman]
|
3092
|
If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false
[Harman]
|
3093
|
Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction
[Harman]
|
3094
|
You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument
[Harman]
|
3095
|
Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations
[Harman]
|
3097
|
We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence
[Harman]
|
3096
|
Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations
[Harman]
|
3098
|
Deductive logic is the only logic there is
[Harman]
|
3099
|
Inference is never a conscious process
[Harman]
|
3101
|
Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred
[Harman]
|
3100
|
You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference
[Harman]
|