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Single Idea 19311
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
]
Full Idea
The key issue in belief revision is whether one needs to keep track of one's original justifications for beliefs. What I am calling the 'foundations' theory says yes; what I am calling the 'coherence' theory says no.
Gist of Idea
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence
Source
Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 4)
Book Ref
Harman,Gilbert: 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' [MIP 1986], p.29
A Reaction
I favour coherence in all things epistemological, and this idea seems to match real life, where I am very confident of many beliefs of which I have forgotten the justification. Harman says coherentists need the justification only when they doubt a belief.
The
70 ideas
from Gilbert Harman
19304
|
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic
[Harman]
|
19303
|
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views
[Harman]
|
19305
|
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence
[Harman]
|
19308
|
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it
[Harman]
|
19307
|
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it
[Harman]
|
19309
|
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate
[Harman]
|
19306
|
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities
[Harman]
|
19310
|
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions
[Harman]
|
19311
|
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence
[Harman]
|
19312
|
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another
[Harman]
|
12588
|
Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality
[Harman]
|
12589
|
Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter
[Harman]
|
12590
|
Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication
[Harman]
|
12592
|
Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication
[Harman]
|
12591
|
Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication
[Harman]
|
12593
|
The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences
[Harman]
|
12594
|
If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one?
[Harman]
|
12597
|
I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely
[Harman]
|
12595
|
We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning
[Harman]
|
12596
|
Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence
[Harman]
|
12598
|
Reality is the overlap of true complete theories
[Harman]
|
12599
|
Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them
[Harman]
|
12600
|
The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts
[Harman]
|
12601
|
The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter
[Harman]
|
12602
|
There is no natural border between inner and outer
[Harman]
|
12603
|
We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world
[Harman]
|
5120
|
What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values
[Harman]
|
5121
|
Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it
[Harman]
|
8800
|
If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects
[Harman, by Sosa]
|
17060
|
Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology
[Harman, by Smart]
|
8130
|
Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism')
[Harman, by Burge]
|
5122
|
Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it
[Harman]
|
5123
|
Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it
[Harman]
|
5124
|
If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait
[Harman]
|
5125
|
Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character
[Harman]
|
6950
|
You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies
[Harman]
|
6951
|
Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are
[Harman]
|
6953
|
All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication
[Harman]
|
6952
|
Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it
[Harman]
|
6955
|
Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation
[Harman]
|
6954
|
A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs
[Harman]
|
6369
|
In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons
[Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
|
3073
|
We see ourselves in the world as a map
[Harman]
|
3074
|
People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious
[Harman]
|
3075
|
Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern?
[Harman]
|
3076
|
Defining dispositions is circular
[Harman]
|
3077
|
Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge
[Harman]
|
3078
|
Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory
[Harman]
|
3079
|
Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions
[Harman]
|
3080
|
Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements
[Harman]
|
3081
|
A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form
[Harman]
|
3082
|
Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form
[Harman]
|
3083
|
Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely
[Harman]
|
3084
|
Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts
[Harman]
|
3085
|
Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition
[Harman]
|
3087
|
The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary
[Harman]
|
3086
|
Are there any meanings apart from in a language?
[Harman]
|
3088
|
Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination
[Harman]
|
3089
|
Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic
[Harman]
|
3090
|
There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning
[Harman]
|
3092
|
If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false
[Harman]
|
3093
|
Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction
[Harman]
|
3094
|
You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument
[Harman]
|
3095
|
Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations
[Harman]
|
3097
|
We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence
[Harman]
|
3096
|
Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations
[Harman]
|
3098
|
Deductive logic is the only logic there is
[Harman]
|
3099
|
Inference is never a conscious process
[Harman]
|
3101
|
Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred
[Harman]
|
3100
|
You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference
[Harman]
|