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Full Idea
The key issue in belief revision is whether one needs to keep track of one's original justifications for beliefs. What I am calling the 'foundations' theory says yes; what I am calling the 'coherence' theory says no.
Gist of Idea
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence
Source
Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 4)
Book Ref
Harman,Gilbert: 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' [MIP 1986], p.29
A Reaction
I favour coherence in all things epistemological, and this idea seems to match real life, where I am very confident of many beliefs of which I have forgotten the justification. Harman says coherentists need the justification only when they doubt a belief.
| 19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
| 19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
| 19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
| 19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
| 19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
| 19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
| 19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
| 19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
| 19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
| 19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |