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Full Idea
Quine suggests that we can have a language with just predicates and no names. Thus for 'Ralph is red' we say 'x Ralphises and x is red'.
Gist of Idea
We might do without names, by converting them into predicates
Source
report of Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.6
Book Ref
Kirkham,Richard L.: 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction' [MIT 1995], p.161
A Reaction
Kirkham discusses this as a way of getting round the lack of names in Tarski's theory of truth (which just uses objects, predicates and quantifiers). Otherwise you must supplement Tarski with an account of what the names refer to.
| 7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| 19321 | We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham] |
| 8455 | Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8456 | Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
| 9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |