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Full Idea
It has been said that there are no disjunctive facts, conditional facts, or negative facts. ...but it is not at all clear why there cannot be facts of this sort.
Gist of Idea
Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts?
Source
Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.6)
Book Ref
Kirkham,Richard L.: 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction' [MIT 1995], p.163
A Reaction
I love these sorts of facts, and offer them as a naturalistic basis for logic. You probably need the world to have modal features, but I have those in the form of powers and dispositions.
| 18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
| 19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
| 19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
| 19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
| 19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
| 19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
| 19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |