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Full Idea
The difference between (a) snow is white, and (b) 'snow is white' true is that the first makes a claim that only depends on the colour of snow, while the second depends both on the colour of snow and the meaning of the sentence 'snow is white'.
Gist of Idea
'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow
Source
John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.61), quoted by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.7
Book Ref
Kirkham,Richard L.: 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction' [MIT 1995], p.167
A Reaction
This is a helpful first step for those who have reached screaming point by being continually offered this apparently vacuous equivalence. This sentence works well if that stuff is a particular colour.
| 19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
| 19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
| 19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
| 15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
| 16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |