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Single Idea 19324
[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
]
Full Idea
Tarski has to define truths so as not to make explicit the relation between a true sentence and an obtaining state of affairs. ...He has to list each sentence separately, and simply assign it a state of affairs.
Gist of Idea
Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs
Source
comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.8
Book Ref
Kirkham,Richard L.: 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction' [MIT 1995], p.172
A Reaction
He has to avoid semantic concepts like 'reference', because he wants a physicalist theory, according to Kirkham. Thus the hot interest in theories of reference in the 1970s/80s. And also attempts to give a physicalist account of meaning.
Related Idea
Idea 19314
For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
The
27 ideas
with the same theme
[truth defined for formal languages, using 'satisfaction']:
21752
|
Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability
[Gödel, by Quine]
|
13338
|
'"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth
[Tarski]
|
19180
|
It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified
[Tarski]
|
19181
|
In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white
[Tarski]
|
19183
|
Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction
[Tarski]
|
19182
|
Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate'
[Tarski]
|
19196
|
Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth
[Tarski]
|
19198
|
We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true
[Tarski]
|
15339
|
Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions
[Tarski, by Horsten]
|
16302
|
Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
19135
|
Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages
[Davidson on Tarski]
|
19138
|
Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning
[Davidson on Tarski]
|
4699
|
Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language
[Tarski, by O'Grady]
|
19324
|
Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs
[Kirkham on Tarski]
|
10672
|
Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence
[Tarski, by Hossack]
|
10844
|
The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining
[Strawson,P]
|
18951
|
For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory
[Putnam]
|
2570
|
The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative
[Haack]
|
13499
|
Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation
[Field,H, by Hart,WD]
|
10818
|
Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions
[Field,H]
|
14965
|
Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true)
[Gupta]
|
10353
|
Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets
[Kusch]
|
15340
|
Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa
[Horsten]
|
15354
|
Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors
[Horsten]
|
19101
|
Disquotation is bivalent
[Misak]
|
19096
|
Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory
[Misak]
|
19106
|
Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'?
[Misak]
|