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Full Idea
I think we should keep both sides: we should be more Democritean and make all actions of bodies mechanical and independent of souls, and we should also be more than Platonic and hold that all actions of souls are immaterial and independent of mechanism.
Gist of Idea
We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [C])
Book Ref
Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Texts', ed/tr. Woolhouse R/Francks,R [OUP 1998], p.235
A Reaction
This is about as dualist as it is possible to get. It certainly looks as if many of Leibniz's doctrines are rebellions against Spinoza (in this case his 'dual aspect monism'). I take Leibniz to be utterly but heroically wrong.
| 21860 | Ideas and things have identical connections and order [Spinoza] |
| 5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
| 2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
| 5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
| 19350 | We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz] |
| 19421 | Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz] |
| 19351 | Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz] |
| 3449 | If parallelism is true, how does the mind know about the body? [Crease] |