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Single Idea 19357

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas ]

Full Idea

It is obvious that green comes from a mixture of blue and yellow; which makes it credible that the idea of green is composed of the ideas of those two colours, although the idea of green appears to us as simple as that of blue.

Gist of Idea

The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.07)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.120


A Reaction

This shows the use of 'idea' at that time for non-verbal mental events and concepts. Ideas are not, then, just undestood as phenomena, but can be analysed and explained more deeply.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [mental events which internally represent reality]:

True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes]
Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid]
An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza]
Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza]
An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza]
Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke]
The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke]
Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke]
Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz]
An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz]
The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz]
We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz]
True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz]
Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley]
Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton]