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Single Idea 19362

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self ]

Full Idea

It is through the knowledge of necessary truths and through their abstraction that we rise to reflective acts, which enable us to think of that which is called "I" and enable us to consider that this or that is in us.

Gist of Idea

We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §30)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Essays', ed/tr. Arlew,R /Garber,D [Hackett 1989], p.217


A Reaction

For Leibniz, necessary truth can only be known a priori. Sense experience won't reveal the self, as Hume observed. We evidently 'abstract' the idea of 'I' from the nature of a priori thought. Animals have no self (or morals) for this reason.


The 29 ideas with the same theme [directly acquiring knowledge of our Selves]:

We have an apparent and a true self; only the second one exists, and we must seek to know it [Anon (Upan)]
Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry]
Self-knowledge needs perception of the affections of the body [Spinoza]
We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz]
Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant]
We gain self-knowledge through action, not thought - especially when doing our duty [Goethe]
What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer]
I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer]
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche]
Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche]
Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche]
Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche]
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger]
How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman]
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam]
Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam]
Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam]
The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski]
Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG]