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Full Idea
I consider abstracta not as real things but as abbreviated ways of talking ...and to that extent I am a nominalist, at least provisionally ...It suffices to posit only substances as real things, and, to assert truths about these.
Gist of Idea
Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (On the Reality of Accidents [1688]), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz
Book Ref
Arthur, Richard T.W.: 'Leibniz' [Polity 2014], p.147
A Reaction
I am a modern nominalist, in my hostility to a serious ontological commitment to abstracta. You get into trouble, though, if you say there are only objects or substances. Physics says reality may all be 'fields', or something.... 'Truths' is good.
| 19382 | Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz] |
| 4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
| 11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
| 4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
| 10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |