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Full Idea
The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility.
Gist of Idea
How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility?
Source
Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.4
A Reaction
[He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this.
| 19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |