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Single Idea 19467
[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
]
Full Idea
I call a 'thought' something for which the question of truth can arise at all. ...So I can say: thoughts are senses of sentences, without wishing to assert that the sense of every sentence is a thought.
Gist of Idea
A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences
Source
Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.327-8 (61))
Book Ref
Frege,Gottlob: 'The Frege Reader', ed/tr. Beaney,Michael [Blackwell 1997], p.328
A Reaction
This builds on his distinction between sense and reference. The reference of every truth sentence is just 'the true', and the sense is the proposition. The concept of a proposition seems indispensable to logic, I would say.
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[propositions as objective abstract entities]:
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17264
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Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion
[Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
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12232
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A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false
[Bolzano]
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4974
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For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts
[Frege]
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16873
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Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all
[Frege]
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16872
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A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove
[Frege]
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19467
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A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences
[Frege]
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18967
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A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence
[Quine]
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18368
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For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature
[Armstrong]
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18370
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A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value
[Armstrong]
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2518
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Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens
[Katz]
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8076
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The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic
[Devlin]
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4604
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If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them?
[Heil]
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10420
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Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled
[Swoyer]
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9451
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Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions
[Bealer]
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19202
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Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things
[Merricks]
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19204
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True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought
[Merricks]
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19210
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The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value
[Merricks]
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21635
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Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires
[Hofweber]
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18862
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Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible?
[Tallant]
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