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Single Idea 19487

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic ]

Full Idea

If there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of existence. Ontology then ends up on a par with natural science.

Gist of Idea

Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses

Source

Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951], p.211)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' [Harvard 1976], p.211


A Reaction

Carnap says ontology is relative to a linguistic framework. 'External' ontology is empty. This quotation gives Quine's main motivation for denying the analytic/synthetic distinction.


The 4 ideas from 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology'

Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]