more on this theme     |     more from this text


Single Idea 19501

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism ]

Full Idea

When faced with an error-possibility we can appeal to background knowledge, as long as the error-possibility does not call into question this background knowledge. The same is not true when we focus on the radical sceptical hypothesis.

Gist of Idea

We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges

Source

Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 2.§5)

Book Ref

Pritchard,Duncan: 'Epistemological Disjunctivism' [OUP 2012], p.85


A Reaction

[reworded] Doubting everything simultaneously just looks like a mad project. If you doubt linguistic meaning, you can't even express your doubts.


The 13 ideas from Duncan Pritchard

Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]