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Single Idea 19505

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty ]

Full Idea

The three main objections to Moore's common-sense refutation of scepticism is that it either begs the question, or it just offers a rival view instead of a refutation, or it uses 'know' in a conversationally inappropriate way.

Gist of Idea

Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly

Source

report of Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§2) by PG - Db (ideas)

Book Ref

Pritchard,Duncan: 'Epistemological Disjunctivism' [OUP 2012], p.114


A Reaction

[I deserve applause for summarising two pages of Pritchard's wordy stuff so neatly]

Related Idea

Idea 6349 I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]


The 13 ideas from Duncan Pritchard

Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]