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Single Idea 19506

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism ]

Full Idea

Standard epistemic internalism faces an uphill struggle when it comes to dealing with radical scepticism, which points in favour of epistemic externalist neo-Mooreanism.

Clarification

'Mooreanism' says common sense rebuts scepticism

Gist of Idea

Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism

Source

Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§3)

Book Ref

Pritchard,Duncan: 'Epistemological Disjunctivism' [OUP 2012], p.119


A Reaction

I incline towards internalism. I deal with scepticism by being a fallibilist, and adding 'but you never know' to every knowledge claim, and then getting on with life.


The 13 ideas from 'Epistemological Disjunctivism'

Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]